You Cannot Raise 2,000 Billion From a Diaspora You Humiliate
The DIASDEV project raises a simple but decisive question: how can a state ask its diaspora to finance it further when the trust between that state and its nationals remains so fragile? The idea of mobilizing the savings of Cameroonians abroad to support national development is not absurd in itself. But it becomes politically fragile the moment it rests on a bond of trust that has not been rebuilt.
The Cameroonian state says it wants to mobilize 2,000 billion FCFA from its diaspora over ten years. At the same time, publicly available information indicates that the diaspora transferred roughly 652 billion FCFA in 2024. These figures show the scale of the ambition. They also say something else: we are not talking here about a mere financial product, but about a political relationship between a country and those who left it — often out of necessity, sometimes out of despair, always at the cost of considerable effort.
As part of work on the Cameroonian diaspora, conducted in the context of the 2025 presidential election, we sought to understand where Cameroonians abroad live, what they do, why they left, and how they see themselves in the nation’s future. This survey — carried out among 6,801 Cameroonians of all backgrounds through associations, student networks, professional networks, gathering places (restaurants, bars, and so on) and “2-0” clubs, residing in 13 countries (notably France, the United States, Canada, Germany, China, Belgium, the United Arab Emirates, England, and others) — was not originally about DIASDEV. Today it takes on particular resonance, because it sheds light on the sociological composition of a diaspora that the state now wishes to turn into a source of national savings.
Sociological snapshot
According to the study’s results, the Cameroonian diaspora is made up in its majority of people from the West region, at 71%. Next come the Centre–South–East at 11%, the Littoral at 8%, the Anglophone regions at 5%, the Greater North at 4%, and other groups at 1%.
This figure is not meant to replace an official worldwide census of the Cameroonian diaspora. It is a survey result, a sociological snapshot drawn from fieldwork and analysis — not a state register. But this snapshot carries undeniable political weight. If it accurately reflects the real structure of the diaspora, then a decisive share of the financial effort DIASDEV expects will come, mechanically, from this majority component.
In other words, the state is not merely asking “the diaspora” for money. It is asking, in practice, for a massive contribution from a clearly identified social and historical component — one that carries a particular memory of the country and maintains a deeply ambivalent relationship with it. That memory is not imaginary. It reaches into Cameroon’s deep history: into the anticolonial struggle, into the nationalist battles, into the state violence that marked the post-independence era.
“The state is not merely asking “the diaspora” for money. It is asking, in practice, for a massive contribution from a clearly identified social and historical component.
To this historical memory is added a difficult socio-political present. For more than a decade, many Cameroonians have denounced the trivialization of stigmatizing remarks aimed at the Great People of the West, in the public sphere and even in the highest circles of government. The point here is not to claim that a court has already ruled on every case. It is to observe that a very large number of citizens feel they are regularly caricatured, insulted, or designated as a national problem — often amid a heavy institutional silence.
The most recent example, widely shared among Cameroonians, is a further reminder of this distressing reality: telling the Bamileke to “go back home,” as if some Cameroonians did not fully belong to the nation, remains a shocking phrase — revealing of a deeper malaise, and one that in fact opens the door to questioning the very form of the state (I will return to this in another op-ed, as it may prove a fine assist). Like it or not, such words accumulate in the consciousness of those they target and end up producing a political consequence: the collapse of National Unity.
If Cameroon’s West region is indeed the sociological backbone of the diaspora, then the DIASDEV project rests first of all on it. And if it rests first of all on it, we must draw every conclusion from that. It means that a substantial share of the resources the state is targeting will come, by extrapolation, from this majority component.
This point is crucial, because it changes the nature of the debate. We are no longer talking only about a national, patriotic project to mobilize resources. We are talking about a financial appeal that rests, in large part, on a group that believes it carries one of the heaviest memories in Cameroon’s contemporary history. We are therefore asking more of those who say they have most often been exposed to suspicion, stigmatization, and denial.
The Yaoundé regime cannot ignore this contradiction. It cannot demand a patriotic saving effort from those it too often leaves to face alone the symbolic humiliations, the administrative delays, and the hostile rhetoric. That would mean building a national project on an already damaged relational foundation. We must also recall an obvious point that Yaoundé overlooks in designing this project: the 652 billion FCFA transferred in 2024 is not a dormant reserve the state can tap at will. That money pays for rent, healthcare, tuition, residence permits, resettlement, family and business ventures, and regular support to relatives left behind. It sustains the balance of thousands of families.
The diaspora did not leave for pleasure. It left because families are seeking a better future for their children. It left because parents ruin themselves and go into debt to fund studies abroad. It left because many believe that school, the economy, and the administration in Cameroon no longer offer them enough guarantees. To ask this diaspora to finance the state still further, without first being accountable to it for the quality of national life, is to ask for an added sacrifice with no credible, guaranteed return.
And if the state captures part of these funds, will it close the gap with a real improvement in living conditions in Cameroon? Will it make it so that Cameroonians no longer need to leave? Will it bring more rigor to the management of public affairs? Will it sanction the agents of hatred who destabilize the very national integration Yaoundé so praises? Will it improve the education system, employment, economic security, and future prospects, so that the diaspora can cease to be the only recourse? That is the real question. Otherwise, we are merely shifting the burden without addressing the cause.
To this malaise are added recurring difficulties: consular delays, opaque procedures, difficult passport renewals, laborious access to administrative services, a sense of abandonment in several host countries. What did Yaoundé do to support the Cameroonians who fell victim to xenophobia in South Africa a few weeks ago? How can you demand maximum financial trust where minimal administrative, social, and political trust is not even guaranteed?
The state wants to mobilize its diaspora’s savings. Fine. But it must first show that it knows how to serve that diaspora with respect. You do not ask citizens to place their money in a national project when they must already fight to obtain a travel document, a consular appointment, or a simple institutional response.
Before asking for 2,000 billion FCFA, those in power should:
- First, explicitly condemn ethnic invective and public stigmatization, wherever they come from, and severely punish those responsible. Institutional silence feeds this social fracture and progressively dismantles the national integration Yaoundé holds so dear.
- Next, urgently modernize consular services. A state that wants to mobilize its nationals must begin by making their administrative lives simpler.
- Then, open a frank dialogue with all social components of the diaspora — not a token dialogue, as has been the case in several projects in Cameroon, but genuine listening to expectations, wounds, grievances, and priorities.
- After that, define the major axes of development together with a task force made up mainly of members of the diaspora, and entrust part of the steering to the diaspora. It’s business. You cannot finance without controlling.
- Finally, guarantee transparent governance of the funds collected. If DIASDEV is to exist, it must be clear, auditable, controllable, and useful. The diaspora will not support a system it suspects of reproducing the very mistakes it is fleeing.
In the end, the real question is not whether the Cameroonian diaspora can contribute. It already contributes, massively, and has for years. The real question is why it should entrust more to a state it judges too slow to respect it, too hesitant to protect it, and too quick to solicit it. If Cameroon sincerely wants to mobilize 2,000 billion FCFA from its diaspora, it must first repair the relationship that will make such mobilization possible — and patriotic. Numbers matter. But without trust, they are only an illusion of power.
And no country will sustainably raise 2,000 billion from a diaspora it humiliates.